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Over the past years, Facebook as well as other online platforms faced constant
criticism and pressure from civil society, lawmakers, and governments regarding
their role in content moderation. As a response, Facebook for the last two years
sought a way to handle the decision-making process in a more transparent,
accountable, and fair way, while at the same time diverting responsibility from itself
and its CEO and sole controller, Mark Zuckerberg. Now, it finally rolls out its plan for
an independent Oversight Board, also referred by some, including Mark Zuckerberg,
as a “Supreme Court”. Major questions arise as to its mandate, the establishment of
global free speech standards and the reactions of national courts. 
The New Oversight System
This week, Facebook released the final “Oversight Board Charter”, together with an
updated version of its community standards. The Charter describes a review system
entailing three institutional players, two of them to be newly established.
The Oversight Board will be initially comprised of 11, later up to 40 members. It
will review content decisions on all of Facebook’s platforms. This entails decisions
to “allow or remove” content as well as the so-called designations of content, like
warning screens or potential classifications as fake/untruthful. Affected users and
Facebook can appeal to the Board, though it will have discretion to pick cases based
on “significance and difficulty”. Its judgements “will be binding on Facebook”. In
addition, the Board will be able to issue case-specific “policy advisory statement(s)”
while Facebook will have the right to ask for general “Policy Guidance”. 
A Trust established and funded by Facebook will secure the Board’s governance,
compensating the Board’s members and providing operational support. More
importantly, it will also appoint new members upon recommendation by the Board
and will have the right to remove members for breaches of a (to be established) code
of conduct, though not for any content decision. 
Facebook will appoint the Board’s initial two members. These will then, together with
Facebook, suggest the other members in accordance with the established Selection
Process. Most importantly, Facebook will be implementing the Board’s decisions
– thus letting the Board “overrule Zuckerberg”. However, it will not do so in case it
“could violate the law”. The Board’s guidance yet is merely advisory and only to be
“consider(ed)”. Facebook will support the Board’s decision-making “to the extent that
requests are technically and operationally feasible and consistent with a reasonable
allocation of Facebook’s resources”.
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Questions Regarding the Board’s Mandate 
The Board in fact does not resemble an all-encompassing Supreme Court. Rather,
the Charter tries to confine its mandateto “review and decide on content”. This
includes whether “content should be allowed or removed completely” and “additional
questions related to the treatment of content”, such as warnings or clarifications. The
Board thus decides on the limits of free speech on the platform. However, it seems
unlikely that the Board will be able to limit its decisions to an assessment of free
speech. Rather, the board will ultimately not be able to avoid expanding its mandate
to many other important fields.
• As part of the review process it will be unavoidable for the Board to decide
on questions of judicial rights and fair processregarding both its own and
Facebook’s handling of content decisions. It will be faced with answering
whether users have “exhausted appeals”, the extent of the right to “submit
relevant and informed written statements”, and standing of groups considered
as “immediately depicted or impacted”. That alone is enough to open a
Pandora’s box of procedural problems. On top of that, the Board will have
to position itself towards issues such as statutes of limitations, necessary
substantiation, legal assistance, equality of arms, and access to justice in
general.
• The Board will have to take a stand on if and how far it can go against
automated content review. It certainly can review automated content decisions
in every single case. However, it seems less clear if it could address systematic
problems with automated decision making. Certainly, it has some tools at its
disposal, as it can ask Facebook to provide information that is “reasonably
required for the Board to make a decision”. Nevertheless, Facebook can
reject such a request in case it is not “technically and operationally feasible”.
Explaining and handing over code could cross that line. 
• It is unclear how far the Board is allowed to delve into questions of policing,
criminal law and sanctioning. When Facebook blocks users for some time or
deletes their accounts, it goes beyond deciding on the permissibility of content.
Rather, it takes measures of preventive policing or ex-post punitive justice. Such
decisions will certainly be appealed before the Board – even if it remains unclear
if they are covered by its mandate.
On the other hand, Facebook aims at excluding some pressing issues  from the
Board’s mandate, though it would have made sense to be included. First, the matter
of election meddling and political ads. It will be important to see if the Board picks
them up anyway. One potential hook is, that even if they are not content in a narrow
sense, they still relate to the broader question of what can and cannot be on the
platform. Second, the ‘Facebook algorithm’ itself. The fact that the Board will not
be able to hear cases on the ranking and dissemination of content constitutes an 
important caveat.  It is this algorithm which has been blamed for leading to the
overspreading of extremist content (also here) or even its creation. This will cause
practical difficulties in the Boards work: so-called “shadowbanning” makes it hard to
draw the line between deleting and just downranking. 
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Establishing a Global Free Speech Standard
The Board’s members will face the unique and seemingly impossible task of
establishing a global standardfor permissible online speech. Although, as others
have acknowledged, there often is no “right” answer, the Board nevertheless
must strive to find ONE globally acceptable solution. This endeavor might take the
establishment of transnational private law to a new level. The sought-after “diversity”
of the members, albeit necessary for the Board’s legitimacy, will make the task
particularly demanding.
The Charter and the updated community standards figure as Facebooks ‘Bill of
Rights’. Putting forward a clear commitment to “voice” as the governing principle and
free speech as the primary right (calling it a “fundamental human right”), Facebook
has arguably already made one of the most “difficult choices” itself. However, both
documents acknowledge that free speech “must be balanced against” other values.
Facebook seems to be leaning towards a Europe-styled balancing approach, though
severe fights over this direction among the Board’s members seem inevitable. This
could be aggravated by the fact that when deciding on the limits of free speech,
the Board members will have to also assess the value and importance of the
counterbalancing human rights. The Charter itself names “authenticity, safety,
privacy, and dignity”. Others will be surfacing, too, like the protection of children
and minorities. On top of this, in case of conflict the hierarchy between the two
documents is not fully clear – as the Charter is changeable only in case the Board,
Trust, and Facebook agree, it seems to reign supreme.
The question of interpretation and hierarchy becomes even more intricate, as the
Charter and the community standards incorporate “human rights norms protecting
free expression” and “international human rights standards” respectively (in line with
the UN Special Rapporteurs suggestions). Thus, the Board will likely try to back up
its decisions with (inter-)national human rights jurisprudence (as e.g. the CAS does
already today). The selection and weighing among the multitude of potential sources
(international human rights bodies, international courts, national courts, etc.) appears
to be an endeavor almost bound to fail. 
Finally, both the Board and Facebook will have to find ways to engage with the limits
on freedom of speech set by national laws. The Charter does not seem to provide
much help in this regard. On the one hand, it is going out of its way to assure it
respects “the law”: it explicitly says that nothing within it “shall be interpreted in a
manner that would result in a violation of law”. On the other hand, however, it also
mandates that the “Board will not purport to enforce local law”, making it clear that
the Board cannot justify its decisions by reference to local standards. How the line
between unitization and fragmentation of free speech on the platform should be
drawn remains Facebook’s secret – as well as a major headache for all the actors
involved.
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The Involvement of National Courts
One of the most important questions, at least from the users’ perspective, will be
how courts deal with the procedure established in the Charter. This question could
be answered differently in different judicial systems. 
From a European and German perspective for example, the first question seems
to be if the courts will accept the Board as an arbitral tribunal. This would translate
into closing the doors to state courts while at the same time allowing for a limited
application of fair trial guarantees (see latest ECtHR, Mutu and Pechstein v.
Switzerland, at 96 on CAS). This, however, appears rather unlikely at least as
far as German law concerned (I have laid out a roadmap elsewhere), given that
the members would be lacking sufficient independence from both parties (see
the German FCJ on CAS). Things might be different though under the ECtHR’s
jurisprudence (Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, at 139 ff., which has accepted the
general setup of CAS).
Even if the Board wasn’t an arbitral tribunal, its establishment could make it harder
for users to find redress in national courts. First, courts might demand the exhaustion
of Facebook’s remedies. This seems very likely, as already today users arguably
have to appeal a content decision before they can take their case to court (see
the jurisprudence of the German courts). Second, courts might take the seemingly
international nature of the Board’s decisions into account when deciding how
much room Facebook should have to decide on the limits of permissible speech.
Less as a question of law (although it could be seen as one) than rather one of
judicial behavior, judges’ likeliness to scrutinize the Board’s decisions might be
diminished. The current strict line of German courts holding Facebook accountable
to constitutional standards of free speech could be softened.
Difficulties could also arise in cases demanding expedite proceedings. Although the
Charter establishes an “Expedite Review”, it is unclear how much time it will actually
take. There might be urgent situations in which national courts feel the need to not
await the Board’s decision but take up the case right away. Lastly, it might also be
difficult for users to determine whom to sue – Facebook, the Trust LLC, or ultimately
both.
Will It Work?
Zuckerberg was not comfortable making “important decisions about speech” –
which governments all over the world have effectively eschewed themselves.
This is particularly true in the U.S. where – arguably – the U.S. Constitution would
prevent the legislator from narrowing the limits of free speech online. In Germany
the task of deciding what stays up or should be taken down was specifically placed
on Facebook (and other platforms) via the Network Enforcement Act. Before this
backdrop, handing this task over to an independent Board suddenly became an
attractive option for Facebook.
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In fulfilling its task, the Board will not give the “right” answers to the question of
how to regulate online speech, but provide legitimacy to its choices in ‘hard cases’.
Given its purported independence, plurality, and fair trial guarantees, the Board
will, unlike Facebook, enjoy the legitimacy held by state courts at least to a certain
degree (see report on Facebook’s transparency). By explaining the reasons behind
its judgements, it will enable an ongoing legitimizing academic, “legal”, and public
discourse over free speech online. However, there are unavoidable complications
and downsides, as detailed above. Most importantly, the Board will still have to prove
its independence from Facebook while it tries to establish its global reputation. If it
succeeds, it could become – for better or worse – a new “model for our industry”.
The job of the Board will not necessarily make it unpopular. Quite the contrary,
chances are the Board will be seen as the guardian of a safe, open, and principled
digital public space – the same way in which many Constitutional and Supreme
Courts around the world are regarded in terms of analog spaces. In case you are
interested: the Board is now hiring.
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